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THE PRIMA FACIE CASE AND REMEDIES IN
TITLE VI HOSPITAL RELOCATION CASES
As a byproduct of the decay of urban centers, many health
care facilities have attempted to relocate in greener suburban pas-
tures.1  This trend at best condemns inner city residents-often
minorities and the poor-to dilapidated medical facilities and in-
ferior medical care. At worst it may completely deny health care
I See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979); Residents
Seek to Block Closing of Hospital Serving Their Community, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 114
(1979) (citing Sylvester v. Southwestern I11. Health Facilities, Inc., No. 78-0178-H-082
(Ill. Health Facilities Planning Bd. 1979)); Class Action Suit by Minority Patients Challenges
Inner City Hospital's Move to Suburbs of San Centorio, Texas, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 531
(1979) (citing United States v. Bexar County, No. SA78CA419 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 1979)).
See also County Must Reopen Rural Health Clinic or Must Comply with Notice and Hearing Re-
quirements Applicable to County Hospital and Other Facilities, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 740
(1977) (citing Huron Community Health Comm. v. Fresno County Bd. of Supervisors, No.
217737-6 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sept. 2, 1977); Proposed Closing of Portion of County Hospital Al-
legedly Does Not Comply with California Law; Petitioners Seek Injunctive Relief, 11 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 387 (1977) (citing Concerned Citizens Comm. Interested in the Tehama Gen.
Hosp. v. Tehama County Bd. of Supervisors, No. 19452 (Cal. Super. Ct., June 1, 1977)).
The limited access of the poor to health care is well documented. See Schneider & Stern,
Health Maintenance Organizations and the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 90,
90-97 (1975); Schwartz & Rose, Opening the Doors of the Non-Profit Hospital to the Poor, 7 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 655 (1974); Rose, Recent Gains for the Poor in Obtaining Access into Hill-Burton
Hospitals, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 145 (1973). The limited access of poor and rural Ameri-
cans is sometimes cited as justification for a national health insurance program. See Public
Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 113-17 (Nov. 5, 1975) (testimony of Ronald Brown).
See also 125 CONG. REc. S12,048 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979) (Health Care for All Americans
Act introduced by Sen. Kennedy).
introduced by Sen. Kennedy).
The problem of adequate access to hospitals and health care is at the heart of Senator
Kennedy's proposed Health Care for All Americans Act. The purpose of the Act is:
(1) to make comprehensive, high quality health-care services available to all
Americans, through the expertise of private health insurers and providers and
the assistance of government;
(2) to provide health-care services of the same quality to all Americans,
regardless of their economic condition and without discrimination on the
grounds of race, religion, or national origin;
(4) to improve the organization and delivery of health-care services;
(6) to distribute equitably the total cost of the health-care service provided
in the United States;
(7) to enhance the quality of health-care services and the practical availabil-
ity of such services in every area of the United States ....
125 CONG. REc. S12,049 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979).
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to urban neighborhoods by ceding all facilities to distant areas in-
accessible to inner city residents.2
The most powerful legal weapon against this migration may
be the private discrimination suit under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 3 Unfortunately, the boundaries of this
theory of relief remain indistinct. Two crucial questions remain
unanswered: what standard of proof must the plaintiff satisfy in
making out his prima facie case, and what remedies are available
in a private suit for violation of Title VI. If the Title VI suit is to
remain an effective measure against inequitable allocation of med-
ical resources, courts should apply the Title VII disproportionate




The history of antidiscrimination law necessarily revolves
around the landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education,4
where the Supreme Court invalidated the "separate but equal"
doctrine and held that segregated school systems violate the four-
teenth amendment equal protection clause. 5 The decision, how-
ever, was merely a starting point; federal courts encountered
strong resistance from the states in implementing Brown's broad
mandate of desegregation.' Recognizing the need for a com-
prehensive federal enforcement mechanism to combat dis-
crimination, 7 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
2 See generally D. HUNTER, THE SLUMS 8-9 (1968); F. KRISTOF, URBAN HOUSING NEEDS
THROUGH THE 1980's, at xii, 45-46 (1968); SOCIAL WELFARE AND URBAN PROBLEMS (T.
Sherrand ed. 1968).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976).
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a discussion of Title VI and its relationship to early prob-
lems with school desegregation, see Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in
the South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42, 42-45 (1967). See also Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964-Implementation and Impact, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 887-970 (1968).
347 U.S. at 495.
6 Dunn, supra note 4, at 42: "[N]ine years after [Brown], ... only 1.17 percent of the
Negro children in the eleven states of the Confederacy were attending desegregated
schools."
7 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963):
The bill is a comprehensive measure, but it cannot, nor should we expect it to,
be a panacea for all our ills. ...
But this bill can and will commit our Nation to the elimination of many of
the worst manifestations of racial prejudice. This is of paramount importance
and is long overdue .... The entire Nation must meet this challenge, and it
must do it now.
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Title VI of the Act, Congress specifically attacked the use of fed-
eral funds to support discriminatory programs. Section 601 pro-
vides that "[nlo person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving federal financial assist-
ance." 8  Congress authorized federal administrative agencies to
promulgate and enforce regulations effectuating the provisions of
Title VI, 9 subject to judicial review. 10
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
Federal assistance covered by Title VI includes grants and loans; donations of
equipment and property; detail of Federal personnel; sale, lease of, or permis-
sion to use Federal property for nominal consideration; and any other ar-
rangement by which Federal benefits are provided .... Title VI [generally]
applies only to Federal assistance which is received indirectly by the intended
beneficiaries, through intermediaries such as State and local governments.
VI UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCE-
MENT EFFoRT-1974, at 1 (1975) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as VI ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT-1974]. Most hospitals or other health care facilities receive Medicare or Medicaid
funds. See 45 C.F.R. 80.13(f), (g) (1979); notes 15-18 and accompanying text infra.
Section 602 of Title VI provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Fed-
eral financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or
contract ... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section
2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance
in connection with which the action is taken .... Compliance with any re-
quirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termina-
tion of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or
activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the
record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such re-
quirement ... or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however,
That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned
has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the
requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by volun-
tary means ....
42 U.S.C. 2000d-1 (1976).
Pursuant to § 602, various departments and agencies, including HEW, promulgated
extensive and basically identical regulations for implementing the broad proscription of §
601. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.1-.143 (1979) (Dep't of Agriculture); 15 C.F.R. §§ 8.1-.15 (1979)
(Dep't of Commerce); 22 C.F.R. §§ 141.1-.12 (1979) (Dep't of State); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.12
(1979) (Dep't of Housing & Urban Development); 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.101-.112, 50.3 (1979)
(Dep't of Justice); 32 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.14 (1979) (Dep't of Defense); 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13
(1979) (Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare); 49 C.F.R. §§ 21.1-.23 (1979) (Dep't of
Transportation).
Title VI agencies modeled their regulations after the initial set of regulations drafted
for HEW in 1964. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HEW AND TITLE VI, A REPORT ON
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION, POLICIES, AND COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 6-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HEW AND TITLE VI].
10 Section 603 of Title VI provides:
Any department or agency action taken pursuant to section 2000d-1 of this
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Although an important goal in enacting Title VI was the pre-
vention of discrimination in education, 1 Congress also sought to
eliminate health care discrimination. 12  The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) attempted to enforce
Title VI in health care institutions, 13 but its early efforts were
largely unsuccessful.' 4  The creation of the Medicare15 and
title shall be subject to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided by law
for similar action taken by such department or agency on other grounds. In the
case of action, not otherwise subject to judicial review, terminating or refusing
to grant or to continue financial assistance upon a finding of failure to comply
with any requirement imposed pursuant to section 2000d-I of this title, any
person aggrieved (including any State or political subdivision thereof and any
agency of either) may obtain judicial review of such action in accordance with
chapter 7 of title 5 [5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706] and such action shall not be deemed
committed to unreviewable agency discretion within the meaning of that chap-
ter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1976).
" See 110 CONG. REc. 6545 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey);
Title VI would have a substantial and eminently desirable impact on pro-
grams of assistance to education. Title VI would require elimination of racial
discrimination and segregation in all "impacted area" schools receiving Federal
grants under Public Laws 815 and 874.
See also 110 CoNG. REc. 6546 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
2 One celebrated example of discrimination was the program developed under the
Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1 (1976). See 110 CONG. REC. 7054 (1964) (re-
marks of Sen. Pastore); 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (remaiks of Sen. Humphrey). The
Hill-Burton program, launched in 1944, was the first major federal investment in health
care delivery. Originally, it was designed to alleviate the problem of bed shortages in hospi-
tals and other facilities. The program required little from the facility beyond an assurance
that it would provide a reasonable volume of care to people unable to pay and that services
would be available to all persons in the area without regard to race, creed, or color. There
was, however, a "separate but equal" exception to the nondiscrimination requirement.
HEW eventually issued new regulations that made such segregation a violation of the
program, but that was only after judicial resolution of the issue. See Simkins v. Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en banc) (participation in Hill-Burton
program sufficient state action to invoke fourteenth amendment), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938
(1964).
13 Title VI was approved on July 2, 1964. On November 27, 1964, HEW issued its first
set of regulations for Title VI enforcement. See 29 Fed. Reg. 16,298-16,303 (1964) (now
codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.13 (1979)).
14 In 1965, the United States Commission on Civil Rights conducted a survey of health
and welfare services in the South. It found that although written agreements to comply
with Title VI had been obtained from most recipients of federal funds, there still con-
tinued
widespread segregation or exclusion of Negroes in federally assisted programs
at the State and local levels .... Discriminatory practices included: (a) assign-
ment to wards or rooms by race (b) exclusion of Negroes from many child care
institutions, nursing homes, and training facilities (c) segregation of patients in
doctors' offices and referral of patients to hospitals on the basis of race (d)
segregation in some State operated hospitals and training facilities and some
federally assisted local health programs.
HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 9, at 19-20.
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Medicaid 16 programs increased HEW's burden by making virtu-
ally all hospitals and nursing homes recipients of federal funds,
and thus subject to Title VI. 17  In the case of Medicare, HEW
required all potential recipient facilities to sign assurances of non-
discrimination with the Office of Equal Health Opportunity
(OEHO).18 But many hospitals and nursing homes that signed
assurances were later found to be in violation of Title VI; one
hospital, for example, segregated its patients by assigning rooms
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395qq (1976). The Medicare program is a federally financed and
administered health insurance program for social security recipients. There are actually
two parts to the program: Part A is the basic section providing hospital insurance, while
Part B "is a voluntary supplementary program covering the costs of physicians' services and
a number of other items and services not covered [by Part A]." COMMERCE CLEARING
HOUSE, 1978 SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE EXPLAINED 601 (1978). Although hospitals
are subject to Title VI, physicians covered by Part B are not. VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-
1974, supra note 8, at 118-19.
Medicare reimbursement was, however, "a substantial financial inducement to hospitals
and other health facilities to comply with Title VI." HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 9, at
44.
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396j (1976). Under this program, Congress made federal funds
available to those states that chose to provide health benefit programs to the poor. As
originally enacted, "the federal Medicaid law left the selection of health care providers
primarily to the discretion of each participating state." Wing, Title VI and Health Facilities:
Forms Without Substance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 137, 158 (1978). As a practical matter, however,
most of the Medicaid facilities were subject to HEW review because they also received
Medicare reimbursement. See VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT- 1974, supra note 8, at 164. For
the regulations promulgated by HEW with respect to Medicaid, see 42 C.F.R. §§ 430, 431,
433, 435, 436, 440, 441, 442, 447, 455, 456 (1978).
17 "HEW was faced with the prospect of administering a program that would reim-
burse nearly 20,000 health facilities ...." Wing, supra note 16, at 158. Prior to the passage
of the Medicare Act, Hill-Burton funds (see note 12 supra) were the major source of federal
funds to health care facilities. The Hill-Burton program, however, only affected about
500-600 hospitals each year-about 6% of the total subsequently covered by Medicare.
HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 9, at 44 n.121.
18 By signing HEW Form 441 (PHS 12/64), entitled "Assurance of Compliance with the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Regulation Under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964," the applicant agreed to observe Title VI "and all requirements im-
posed by or pursuant to the Regulation of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (45 C.F.R. Part 80) issued pursuant to that title .. " In addition, the applicant
expressly recognized that "Federal Financial assistance will be extended in reliance on the
representations and agreements made in this assurance and that the United States shall
have the right to seek judicial enforcement of this assurance." HEW AND TITLE VI, supra
note 9, at 18-19.
HEW also developed facility compliance report forms to seek information in about a
dozen areas for each category of health care provider. Some questions pertained to nondis-
criminatory use of facilities. Others involved staff privileges of black physicians and den-
tists. The most important item of the form however, was the "patient census," a breakdown
by race and by occupancy of the patients in the facility. HEW officials used the patient
census to determine which facilities required compliance reviews. HEW AND TITLE VI,
supra note 9, at 28 n.72, 29 n.74.
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on the basis of race.1 9  Moreover, OEHO rarely denied hospitals
clearance for Medicare, and it eventually reinstated most of the
facilities it found ineligible.20 Critics charged that the under-
staffed OEHO investigated institutions sporadically2 1 and in-
adequately, 22 and that its efforts achieved only "paper com-
pliance." 23
Since 1967, HEW enforcement efforts in the health care in-
dustry have steadily declined. 24  Although HEW increased the
number of officers handling Title VI and Medicare, and cen-
tralized enforcement in the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), com-
pliance by health care facilities has become a second priority. 25
,9 VI ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 8, at 116:
[A]s late as the 1970's, HEW found such blatant discrimination as segregated
waiting rooms and different hours for black and white patients by physicians
receiving HEW funds, inadequate minority representations on a State health
planning council, the use of "Mr.," Mrs.," and "Miss" to address white but not
black patients, and segregation in HEW-funded day care centers.
20 For example, by January 1968, HEW had cleared 7,400 hospitals and 6,300 ex-
tended care facilities for Medicare participation. Thus, 97% of all hospitals were officially
committed to nondiscriminatory provision of services. Only 12 hospitals had lost federal
funds because of failure to comply with Title VI. HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 9, at
46-47.
All of the 16 hospitals that lost funding during the late 1960's and early 1970's re-
gained the assistance after HEW found they had come into compliance. VI ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT-1974, supra note 8, at 206 n.540. For an example of a case where HEW termi-
nated funds but later rescinded the order, see id. at 206-09 (California Odd Fellows Infir-
mary).
21 HEW did not periodically review the institutions if cleared for Medicare. As one
report stated in 1970:
[I]n the absence of periodic compliance review or, at a minimum, a follow-up
study, it would be premature to assume that medical facilities have attained
complete and lasting compliance with Title VI. Since most extended care
facilities and nursing homes also have never been subject to filed review, their
current status with respect to Title VI can only be a matter of conjecture.
HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 9, at 47.
2 In the spring of 1966, OEHO launched a major effort to review hospitals for Medi-
care certification, including a "crash" effort to train hospital compliance officers. In Feb-
ruary, when OEHO was established, there were five permanent staff members; by July,
almost 500 persons were engaged in the hospital compliance program. Most of those per-
sons, however, were temporary summer employees and staff on detail from Public Health
Service regional offices. Consequently, OEHO shrank from 500 persons to 30 by the fall.
HEW AND TITLE VI, supra note 9, at 44-46. In addition, one report has criticized the
allegedly inadequate training received by the investigators. Id. at 16.
23 See id. at 71-72:
Reliance on paper compliance which characterized the Title VI enforce-
ment effort several years ago is still much too prevalent. Many primary recip-
ients of Federal assistance never have been reviewed and most vendors of serv-
ice to State agencies also have escaped review.
24 See id. at 45.
25 By mid-1967, the number of complaints of Title VI violations began to decline and
thereafter HEW spent less time investigating health care facilities. HEW AND TITLE VI,
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OCR has increased its staff and funding since its early days,26 but
has nonetheless adopted a bureaucratic rather than an enforce-
ment role: it now processes Title VI assurances from institutions
certified for Medicare, requires state agencies to submit state en-
forcement plans, investigates complaints against recipients, and
only occasionally conducts special studies.2 7  It has largely ignored
the discriminatory effects resulting from the relocation of medical
facilities.
Recognizing the inadequacy of HEW's enforcement efforts,
private plaintiffs have brought their own Title VI suits, even
though the statute does not explicitly authorize a private cause of
action. From the beginning, most lower courts recognized the pri-
vate cause of action,28 and the Supreme Court finally implied its
approval of the majority view in Cannon v. University of Chicago.-9
supra note 9, at 30. The United States Commission on Civil Rights reported that OCR
received only 300 complaints against health facilities during fiscal year 1974. VI ENFORCE-
MENT EFFORT-1974, supra note 8, at 180. By comparison, OCR had a backlog of approxi-
mately 3,025 complaints, primarily against educational institutions, in 1977. 42 Fed. Reg.
39,824 (1977).
There are perhaps two reasons why educational facilities demanded more attention
than medical institutions. First, problems with school desegregation had been at the heart
of the Civil Rights Act, and problems implementing Brown had put schools in the limelight.
Second, medical care was a less controversial topic during the 1960's when the cost was still
somewhat contained. The recently skyrocketing cost of medical care, however, has focused
attention on medical institutions. See SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH, COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
& SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 96TH CONG., lST SESS., HOSPITAL COST
CONTAINMENT 1-7 (Comm. Print 1979); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., Hos-
PITAL COST CONTAINMENT 1-4 (Comm. Print 1977).
26 OCR was budgeted for 1,102 positions in 1978. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,824 (1977). When
the OEHO was handling Title VI enforcement in late 1966, its staff numbered 30. See note
22 supra.
27 Wing, supra note 16, at 163.
2 See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1254 (3d Cir. 1979); Bossier
Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 388 U.S. 911 (1967);
Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (D. Conn. 1979); Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm., 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Blackshear Residents
Org. v. Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146, 1150 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (by implication);
Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 1382, 1383-84 (E.D. Va. 1972) (by
implication); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 583-84 (N.D. Ill.
1967). But see Clark v. Louisa County School Bd., 472 F. Supp. 321, 323 (E.D. Va. 1979).
29 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon, an unsuccessful applicant for admission on two
medical schools alleged that the schools had discriminated against her on the basis of sex,
in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1683
(1976). Although the Court did not have before it a Title VI claim, its holding that Title
IX allowed a private cause of action relied in part on the fact that "Title IX was patterned
after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" (id. at 694), and that "[i]n 1972 when Title
IX was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had already been construed as creating a private
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Because the private Title VI suit, unlike suits under the fourteenth
amendment and 42 U.S.C. "§ 1983,30 can be brought against any
recipient of federal funds regardless of state action, 3' Title VI of-
fers the plaintiff the broadest, and most promising, avenue of
redress.
32
remedy" (id. at 696) (emphasis added). The Court thus suggested that Congress had
sanctioned implied private actions under Title VI by using it as a model in constructing
Title IX.
The Court also interpreted two of its own prior holdings as implicitly recognizing a
private cause of action for Title VI:
Although in neither case [Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566, 569 (1974) and
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 286 (1976) ] did the Court in terms address
the question of whether Title VI provides a cause of action, in both the issue
had been explicitly raised by the parties at one level of the litigation or another.
These cases are accordingly consistent, at least, with the widely accepted as-
sumption that Title VI creates a private cause of action.
441 U.S. at 702 n.33.
30 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (emphasis added).
"' The source of congressional power to enact Title VI is article I, § 8 of the Consti-
tution-not the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. Section 8 authorizes
Congress to lay and collect taxes in order to provide for the general welfare. "The power
to tax ... includes the power to spend and ... the power to lay down the conditions upon
which federal funds are to be dispensed." See II STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1019 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970).
"2 Mere regulation of or involvement with a private entity does not constitute state
action under the fourteenth amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Jackson v. Met-
ropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). There must be "a sufficiently close nexus be-
tween the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at 351. Mere state funding of the
injurious private activity, without more express fostering or encouragement, is not a suffi-
ciently close nexus. For cases where courts have refused to find state action despite the
receipt of Hill-Burton funds, Medicare and Medicaid payments, tax exemptions, and state
regulation, see Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 313 (9th Cir.
1974); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1973); Ward v. St.
Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 675 (10th Cir. 1973); Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392 (8th
Cir. 1976); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1000 (1975); Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp., Inc., 487 F.2d 502-03 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974). But see Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (state action exists under § 1983 where hospital relied on
Medicare funds for at least 30% of its operating budget, was subject to significant govern-
mental regulation, and most importantly, had its entire board of directors appointed by the
town board).
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II
NAACP v. WILMINGTON MEDICAL CENTER
The ongoing litigation in NAACP v. Wilmington Medical
Center33 exemplifies private plaintiffs' attacks on planned hospital
relocations. The dispute arose from the Center's 34 decision to
move major components of its system from existing inner-city di-
visions to an outlying suburban location. Under its proposed "Plan
Omega," the Center would close two of its three inner-city hospi-
tals,33 renovate the third,36 and open a new $60 million, 800 bed
hospital in a suburb eight miles from downtown Wilmington.
37
The Fourth Circuit, however, has consistently found state action based solely on the
receipt of Hill-Burton funds. See Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 503
F.2d 512, 515 (4th Cir. 1974); Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 496 F.2d
174, 178 (4th Cir. 1974); Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir.
1969); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Harron v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 194, 197
(N.D. W. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
916 (1976).
'3 This case stretches across seven reported decisions. In chronological order, they are:
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. (WMC), 426 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. Jan. 19,
1977); NAACP v. WMC, 436 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Del. Aug. 16, 1977); NAACP v. WMC, 453
F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 1978); NAACP v. WMC, 453 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. June 21,
1978); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 1978); Wilmington
United Neighborhoods v. United States, 458 F. Supp. 628 (D. Del. Sept. 22, 1978);
NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. June 4, 1979). This note uses the
name "Wilmington" to refer to the litigation as a whole.
34 [The Center is] a privately owned, nonprofit general hospital organized and
incorporated [in Delaware.... As a multi-unit hospital system, [it] is ... the
principal health care resource for the State of Delaware and especially for the
city of Wilmington and the surrounding metropolitan area. Of the eight gen-
eral hospitals in the state, four are controlled by [the Center]. Its three major
divisions, moreover, operate about 1,100 beds or nearly 75 percent of the avail-
able acute care beds in the city and New Castle County.
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 280, 285 (D. Del. 1978). Obvi-
ously, the Center's plan will critically affect the allocation of medical resources in Delaware.
'3 The Center controls three major hospitals and a smaller rehabilitation facility in
Wilmington. Plan Omega would close the General Division hospital (280 beds) and the
Memorial Division hospital (282 beds). Id. at 285 & n.10.
16 Under the plan, the Delaware Division hospital would be restored and modernized,
and would be the Center's only sophisticated health care resource in that city. The Dela-
ware Division hospital now has 542 beds, but under the plan it would be reduced in size to
250 beds. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. at 286-87. In effect, the plan
would decrease the number of available beds in Wilmington from 1,104 to 250. 599 F.2d
1247, 1249 n.5 (3d Cir. 1979).
17 The Court cited a variety of factors favoring the relocation plan. Most significant was
a population shift from the city to the suburbs. Relocation would facilitate the development
of a "doughnut" shaped health care system-with the acute tertiary care center oc-
cupying the hole of the doughnut and satellite facilities located on the periphery. 453 F.
Supp. at 286.
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The program would remove most special pediatric, obstetric, ter-
tiary care, and sophisticated services from Wilmington, but would
retain emergency room services. 8
The plaintiffs contended that Plan Omega would "result in a
segregated, dual hospital system, in violation of ... Title VI and
section 504" 39 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.40 They pre-
dicted that the Center's remaining urban facility would become a
"ghetto" hospital serving primarily minorities and the poor, el-
derly, or handicapped, while the proposed suburban hospital
would treat only the more affluent white population. The plain-
tiffs also feared that the relocation of certain acute care services
exclusively at the new suburban hospital would make them virtu-
ally inaccessible to many handicapped and minority residents.
The legal battle began with the plaintiffs' attempt to invali-
date the HEW Secretary's approval of the plan. 41  The court
ordered an HEW investigation, 42 which discovered potential vio-
38 Id. at 286-87 n.14.
39 Id. at 289.
40 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (amended 1978). Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined
in section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance.
The section is similar to § 601 of Title VI. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. In their
first suit, the plaintiffs put particular emphasis on HEW's regulations. In seeking review of
the Secretary's decision approving Plan Omega, they pointed out that the predecessor to 45
C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(3) (1979) specifically proscribes site selections that would have a dis-
criminatory effect. 426 F. Supp. at 925 n.18. See also notes 106-115 and accompanying text
infra.
41 See 426 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977). On March 16, 1976, the Center applied to the
Bureau of Comprehensive Health Planning (BCHP) for approval of Plan Omega under
§ 1122 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-1 (1976) (amended 1979). Such approval
would assure the Center that federal compensation for Medicare, Medicaid and programs
for maternal and child health services would not be reduced on the ground that its
capital expenditure program (Plan Omega) was "unreasonable" or "unnecessary." 453 F.
Supp. at 288. Congress expressly enacted § 1122 to prevent the use of federal funds for
unnecessary capital expenditures. At the same time, Congress wanted to encourage plan-
ning activities with respect to health services and facilities in the various states.
The BCHP, with the help of a local health planning group known as the Health Plan-
ning Council, Inc. (HPC), reviewed the Center's application for § 1122 approval, con-
ducted public hearings, and ultimately approved Plan Omega in June 1976. About two
months later, HEW, after receiving the reports from BCHP and HPC, approved the plan.
426 F. Supp. at 923.
42 426 F. Supp. at 925. The district court directed the Secretary to investigate whether
the proposed relocation violated either Title VI or § 504, and to file a report describing
the method he planned to use to proceed on the complaint. The court managed to avoid
the question of whether or not a private cause of action existed, electing to treat the plain-
tiffs' complaint as "information" sufficient to trigger a Title VI investigation under the
Secretary's regulations. Id. at 924.
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lations of Title VI and section 504, and led to plan changes de-
signed to achieve compliance.43 The plaintiffs then argued that
both the investigation and the plan changes were inadequate. The
court, however, found that HEW's determinations were not arbi-
trary and capricious, and upheld the investigation and plan
changes.44
The plaintiffs' other gambits fared no better. They argued
that the Center could not build the proposed hospital because the
Secretary had failed to file an environmental impact statement
45
as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.46
The courts, however, found that the Act did not apply since the
Secretary's approval was not "major federal action." 47 Un-
daunted, the plaintiffs tried another tack and challenged the
constitutionality of the administrative regulations promulgated by
the Secretary under Title VI and section 504. But the court found
no due process violation in HEW's failure to accord plaintiffs a
trial-type hearing on their dissatisfaction with the Secretary's vol-
untary settlement of their complaint. It also rejected an equal pro-
tection challenge of the differing procedural protections afforded
recipients and complainants.48
'3 453 F. Supp. at 310-30. Following the court's directive, OCR carried out an extensive
investigation that lasted more than six months and produced a record exceeding 6,000
pages. In July 1977, OCR concluded that Plan Omega would violate both Title VI and
§ 504, and enumerated twelve areas in which the plan would have to be "modified to
achieve compliance with the statutes and the Secretary's regulations." Id. at 291-92.
Several months of serious negotiations between the Center and OCR followed OCR's
determination that Plan Omega would violate Federal law. On November 1, 1977, the
Center signed a contract of assurances that obligated it to make certain changes in the plan
in order to achieve compliance. These changes included a comprehensive transportation
plan featuring bus service between the inner-city hospital and the suburban hospital. Id. at
312.
" The court also found that the administrative remedy provided under § 602 was
exclusive and that plaintiffs therefore did not have a private cause of action under Title VI
or § 504. This holding was later reversed. See 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
In another suit, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully claimed that the § 1122 approval had
expired due to the Center's failure to incur "an enforcement contract" within 18 months,
as required by 42 C.F.R. § 100.109(a) (1979). 458 F. Supp. at 642-43 & n.66 (D. Del. 1978).
"' 426 F. Supp. at 425.
46 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976). The district court had ordered the Secretary to recon-
sider his decision not to file a statement. 426 F. Supp. at 926. The Secretary reconsidered
and again refused to file even though he recognized that Plan Omega would significantly
affect the quality of the human environment.
47 See 436 F. Supp. at 1202. The court of appeals held that § 1122 approval did not
amount to a direct financial commitment that would require an environmental impact
statement. Morever, the court noted that HEW's sole participation in the project was the
Secretary's ministerial approval of a capital expenditure proposal. 584 F.2d at 634.
48 See 453 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1978). The regulations in issue were 45 C.F.R.
§§ 80.7-.12 (1979). Specifically, the equal protection argument centered on the fact that
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Finally, plaintiffs alleged that the planned relocation violated
Title VI. Of all the theories of recovery, only the Title VI claim
survived summary proceedings at the outset of the litigation. 49
But even though the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed to trial on
the merits, 50 two crucial yet unresolved issues cloud the future of
Wilmington and all other Title VI suits.
III
THE TITLE VI SUIT
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case Under Title VI
1. The Current Split of Authority
The private Title VI suit may prove a potent weapon for
plaintiffs challenging discriminatory hospital relocations. Its util-
ity, however, will largely depend on the standard of proof re-
quired to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Faced with
vague statutory language, 5' inconclusive legislative history, 2 and
ambiguous Supreme Court interpretations, 53 lower courts have
applied three different standards.
applicants for, or recipients of, federal asistance were accorded a hearing before a grant of
assistance to them was withheld or terminated, whereas persons charging a particular recip-
ient with discrimination received no hearing on the merits of their claims. 453 F. Supp. at
347.
49 See 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979). This appeal followed the Supreme Court's decision
in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), authorizing a private remedy
under Title IX and Title VI. Reversing the district 'court, the Third Circuit held that a
private cause of action was implicit in § 601 of Title VI and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 for plaintiffs who seek declaratory and injunctive relief. It remanded the case for a
trial on the merits.
"' At the time this Note was written, the trial court had not rendered a final decision
on the merits of the Wilmington case.
The broad language of Title VI does not explicitly define discrimination or indicate
the standard of proof necessary for a prima facie case. See notes 8-10 and accompanying
text supra. On its face, the statute prohibits any discrimination, intentional or unintentional,
that denies, on the basis of race, color or national origin, "the benefits of... any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
52 Congress clearly meant to prevent federal funds from supporting discriminatory
programs. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). But whether
or not Congress intended Title VI to cover programs that only have a discriminatory
impact-as opposed to those with a discriminatory purpose-is unclear. Congress simply
did not define "discrimination." In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
286-87, 340, the Supreme Court inferred from Congress' refusal to define "discrimination"
an intent to use the constitutional definition under the equal protection clause of the fifth
amendment. See notes 81-86 and accompanying text infra.
13 See notes 79-103 and accompanying text infra.
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a. The "Irrebuttable Effects" Standard. An "irrebuttable effects"
standard creates the lightest burden for plaintiffs. Under this
model, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case simply by show-
ing that the policy or practice in question has a discriminatory
impact. The defendant cannot rebut with any nondiscriminatory
justification; he prevails only by showing that his actions did not
cause the discriminatory impact.
In Lora v. Board of Education,54 the court apparently applied
this standard in a suit challenging New York City's procedures
and facilities for the placement of education of emotionally dis-
turbed children. 55 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants'
"special day school" 56 system perpetuated a racially segregated
school system in violation of Title VI and various constitutional
and statutory provisions. 57  They contended that the city based
the referral and assignment of students to special day schools on
"vague and subjective criteria"5 8 which had a racially discrimina-
tory impact on black and Hispanic children.5 9 The court held
that evidence of discriminatory impact sufficed to establish a
prima facie violation of Title VI and that "[n]o intent to discrimi-
nate need be demonstrated."6 Once the plaintiffs established a
prima facie violation, the court added, the burden would shift to
the "defendants to rebut the inference that their actions are a
substantial cause of the racial disparity . ,, 61 The court did not
recognize any other defenses to the plaintiffs' Title VI claim.
6 2
54 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
55 The plaintiffs' allegations included: vague and subjective placement criteria; exces-
sive class size; inadequate support services; deficiencies in the curriculum, extra-curricular
activities, and special programs; and racial and economic discrimination in private insti-
tutional placement. Id. at 1245-56.
'" The special day schools are designed to provide a therapeutic atmosphere for chil-
dren whose emotional problems manifest themselves in severe aggression. Id. at 1213-14.
'7 The plaintiffs' original complaint alleged violations of the fourth, eighth, thirteenth,
and fourteenth amendments, as well as infringements of their rights under the Civil Rights
Statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 2000d (1976). Later, the plaintiffs amended their plead-
ings with claims based on the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-1461 (1976) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976). Id. at
1215.
58 456 F. Supp. at 1216.
59 Id.
60 456 F. Supp. at 1277.
61 Id.
12 The Court later explained in detail the burdens of proof for constitutional claims, but
again it failed to specify what, if any, steps the defendant could take (other than the causa-
tion defense) to rebut a Title VI prima facie case. Id. at 1277, 1284.
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b. The Title VII Standards. Several courts 63 have erected a
more formidable barrier to plaintiffs by applying the standards
developed in Title VII 64 employment discrimination cases. Title
VII plaintiffs may proceed by showing either "disproportionate
impact" or "disparate treatment." Both theories allow the defend-
ant to counter the plaintiff's prima facie showing of dis-
criminatory effects with nondiscriminatory justifications.65
Under the disproportionate impact standard, the plaintiff es-
tablishes a prima facie case by proving that the employer's policy,
although fair on its face, has a substantially disproportionate im-
pact on his class, that is, "that the tests in question select appli-
cants for hire or promotion in a ... pattern significantly different
from that of the pool of applicants." 66  The burden then shifts to
the employer to prove that its policy is job-related.6 7  If the
employer meets that burden, the plaintiff may still prevail by
showing that other less discriminatory "tests or selection devices
... would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient
and trustworthy workmanship.' " 68 By demonstrating other al-
ternatives, the plaintiff shows that the defendant's choice of test-
ing device was probably motivated by discriminatory intent.
6 '
11 See Larry P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270 RFP (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979); Guardians Ass'n
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), See also Gilliam v.
Omaha, 388 F. Supp. 842, 847-48 (D. Neb. 1975).
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). This title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, and national
origin by public and private employers. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1976 & Supp. 1979).
" For a thorough discussion of the two standards, see Friedman, The Burger Court and
the Prima Facie Case in Employment Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3-15 (1979).
The Supreme Court has never specified the quantum of adverse impact sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 64, at 73-74. Consequently,
lower courts have differed on what is "substantial adverse impact." A number of courts
have used a guideline prescribed by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC).
Under the OFCC rule, "adverse effect" occurs when the acceptance rate of the protected
group is less than 80% of the acceptance rate of the remaining group. See cases cited in B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 64, at 35 n.28 (Supp. 1979).
66 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). See Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
67 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
68 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
69 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). "Such a showing would be
evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination." Id.
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Under Title VII's disparate treatment standard, the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case by showing that he belongs to a class
protected by Title VI; 70 that he applied for a job he was qualified
to perform and was nevertheless rejected; and that the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
with the plaintiff's qualifications. 7' The defendant must then
"articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection."72 If the defendant meets that burden, the
plaintiff may show that the defendant's justification is merely a
pretext camouflaging a discriminatory purpose. 3 This third
stage focuses on the defendant's subjective motivation.
Although both Title VII theories allow a claimant to establish
a prima facie case with evidence of discriminatory impact, the dis-
proportionate impact standard probably places a heavier prima
facie burden on the plaintiff because it often requires a compli-
cated statistical showing of effects.7 4  On the other hand, the dis-
proportionate impact standard also makes it more difficult for the
defendant to rebut at the second stage. It is surely harder for the
employer to prove job-relatedness-a showing that frequently en-
tails complicated statistical proof of the validity of testing
procedures 75-than to present "some credible evidence"' 71 of a
70 Title VII protects against discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color,
sex, religion, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2GO0e to 2000e-17 (1976) (Title VI prohibits
only discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976)).
" McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (footnote omitted).
72 Id. As one commentator has noted, this apparently straightforward language con-
tains a dual ambiguity:
First, the Court's use of "articulate" as opposed to "prove" perhaps implied that
the defendant bears only a light burden after the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case. Second, the Court failed to indicate clearly whether the defendant's
evidence must show the existence of a single, nondiscriminatory justification or
must help negate the presence of any discriminatory motive, [emphasis in
original].
Friedman, supra note 65, at 4. Two later Supreme Court decisions also failed to define the
defendant's burden, beyond saying that an employer need not prove the absence of dis-
criminatory purpose. See Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24 n.1 (1978) (per
curiam); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978). See also B. SCHLEI &
P. GROSSMAN, supra note 64, at 314.
73 Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 n.1 (1978) (per curiam); Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 804 (1973).
74 See B. ScHLEi & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 64, at 1161-93 (1976); id. at 318-30 (Supp.
1979).
7' See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 64, at 75-126 (1976); id. at 36-38 (Supp.
1979).
76 Friedman, supra note 65, at 7.
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nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.77
Moreover, by decreasing the chances of a successful rebuttal by
the defendant, the disproportionate impact standard tends to dis-
pose of litigation without forcing the plaintiff to demonstrate the
defendant's intent.
78
The plaintiff's response to the defendant's rebuttal may also
differ under the two standards. The disproportionate impact
plaintiff need only show that a less discriminatory selection device
would serve the employer's legitimate interest. In contrast, the
disparate treatment plaintiff must prevail on the issue of pretext,
a question relating much more directly to the defendant's state of
mind.
c. The Constitutional Standard. Recently, a number of courts 7:
have applied the very strict discriminatory purpose test originally
developed in suits alleging constitutional violations.8 0 The Su-
preme Court's opinion in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke 8, is responsible for this trend. In Bakke, a Title VI suit chal-
lenging a medical school's affirmative action admissions program,
five members of the Court, in two separate opinions, concluded
that Title VI proscribed only discrimination that the fourteenth or
fifth amendments would prohibit if state action were present.82
Citing "clear" legislative intent, Justice Powell asserted that "Title
VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that
would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amend-
1 See note 72 supra.
71 B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 64, at 1156.
"I See Baker v. City of Detroit, Nos. 5-71937, 5-72264 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 1, 1979); Brown
v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (D. Conn. 1979); Valadez v.
Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149, 159 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Harris v. White, 21 F.E.P. Cases 389, 392
(D. Mass. 1979).
11 In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held that proof of dispro-
portionate impact did not suffice to prove unconstitutional racial discrimination. To prevail
on a constitutional claim of racial discrimination, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory
intent. Id. at 238-39, 242, 245.
8' 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For a discussion of Bakke and the issues it left unresolved, see
Motley, From Brown to Bakke: The Long Road to Equality, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 315,
325-27 (1979).
"2 438 U.S. at 287, 328. The five justices were Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,
and White. See notes 83-86 and accompanying text, infra. The remaining four justices de-
clined to consider "the congruence-or lack of congruence-of the controlling statute and
the Constitution." Id. at 417.
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ment." 3 In a concurring opinion joined by three other jus-
tices,8 4 Justice Brennan reached the same conclusion. 85  He
reasoned that "Congress intended the meaning of the statute's
prohibition to evolve with the interpretation of the commands of
the Constitution." 8
6
Lower courts have split over the proper interpretation of
Bakke. Some courts read Bakke's equation of Title VI's scope with
that of the Constitution to imply that Title VI plaintiffs must meet
the constitutional standard of proof and show discriminatory pur-
pose as part of the prima facie case. 7 Other courts, finding no
specific holding in Bakke bearing on standards of proof, rely on
the Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols 88 and require only a showing
of discriminatory effects. 89  In Lau, the Court held that a school
system's failure to provide English instruction to approximately
eighteen hundred Chinese-speaking children violated Title VI by
denying them a meaningful education. 90 Citing HEW regulations
that clearly defined an effects test, the Court required no proof of
discriminatory intent.9 1
The Supreme Court recently passed up a chance to clarify
the Bakke language in Board of Education v. Harris.92 In Harris, a
school board sued to enjoin HEW from holding it ineligible for
assistance under the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA).93  HEW
83 438 U.S. at 287. Justice Powell admitted that "isolated statements of various legis-
lators, taken out of context, can be marshaled in support of the proposition that § 601
enacted a purely color-blind scheme," but said that "these comments must be read against
the background of both the problem that Congress was addressing and the broader view of
the statute that emerges from a full examination of the legislative debates." Id. at 284-85
(footnote omitted).
84 Justice Brennan wrote for Justice White, Marshall, and Blackmun.
85 438 U.S. at 328.
86 Id. at 340.
87 See Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (D. Conn. 1979);
Valadez v. Graham, 474 F. Supp. 149, 159 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Harris v. White, 21 F.E.P.
Cases 389, 397 (D. Mass. 1979).
88 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
89 See Larry P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270 RFP (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979); Jackson v. Con-
way, 476 F. Supp. 896, 903 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (citing Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp.
1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) and Lau); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273,
1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
98 414 U.S. at 568-69.
91 Id. at 567-68. The Court relied on 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.3(b)(1), 80.3(b)(2), 80.5(b) (1979).
92 100 S. Ct. 363 (1979).
93 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619 (1976). The Act was repealed and simultaneously re-enacted
with amendments by Title VI of the Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561,
92 Stat. 2252, 2268 (effective Sept. 30, 1979). The reenactment is recodified as 20 U.S.C.
§§ 3191-3207 (1979). Under the ESAA, an educational agency is ineligible for assistance if,
after the date of the Act, it
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had based its ineligibility determination upon a finding by its Of-
fice of Civil Rights that the Board's school system violated Title
VI. 94 The Court concluded that evidence of impact was suffi-
cient for a prima facie case under the ESAA, citing statutory lan-
guage expressly proscribing discriminatory effects. 95 It left the
issue open with respect to Title VI. 96
The majority, however, hinted that it preferred a purpose
test for Title VI. In dicta, Justice Blackmun noted the severity of
the cut-off remedy under Title VI and speculated the "Congress
would wish this drastic result only when the discrimination is in-
tentional." 97 In a footnote, the Court added that the similarity of
remedies under Title VI and the ESAA did not necessarily imply
that Title VI had as broad a scope as the ESAA. 98
Justice Stewart, writing for the three dissenters,9 9 directly
confronted the Title VI issue. He observed that Bakke construed
Title VI to prohibit only discrimination violative of the fifth
amendment or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 100 Because those constitutional provisions prohibit
only purposeful discrimination, he reasoned that Title VI "con-
tain[s] not a mere disparate impact standard, but a standard of
intentional discrimination." 101
The state of the law after Bakke and Harris is far from clear.
Four members of the Bakke Court expressed "serious doubts"
about Lau's "implication that impact alone is in some contexts suf-
ficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VI. ' 102 An
had in effect any practice, policy, or procedure which results in the dis-
proportionate demotion or dismissal of instructional or other personnel from
minority groups in conjunction with desegregation or the implementation of
any plan or the conduct of any activity described in this section, or otherwise
engaged in discrimination based upon race, color, or national origin in the hir-
ing, promotion, or assignment of employees of the agency.
20 U.S.C. § 3196(c)(I)(B) (Supp. 11 1978) (formerly 20 U.S.C. § 1605(d)(1)(B)).
94 HEW found that the school district had discriminated on the basis of race in the
assignment of teachers and maintained a segregated system in violation of the fourteenth
amendment, the ESAA, and Title VI. Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 587 (2d
Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363 (1979).
95 100 S. Ct. at 366.
96 Id. at 374.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 374 n.13.
99 Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
100 100 S. Ct. at 379 (dissenting opinion, Stewart, J.).
101 Id.
102 438 U.S. at 352 (concurring and dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.).
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equal number of justices, however, did not question Lau's prece-
dential value.0 3 The ninth member, Justice Powell, concluded
that Title VI tracks the Constitution in scope but nevertheless
managed to distinguish Lau.'14  Arguably, Lau and its effects
standard therefore survive Bakke.
All nine members of the Harris Court suggested that Title VI
prohibits only intentional discrimination,' 0 5 but these views are
dicta. The majority did not, however, indicate that the plaintiff
must show intent as part of his prima facie case. The Title VII
standards, which permit courts to infer intent from showings of
pretext or less discriminatory alternatives, may satisfy the Harris
intent requirement. In short, neither Bakke nor Harris conclusively
establishes a standard of proof for Title VI.
2. The Appropriate Standard for Hospital Relocation Cases
In selecting the proper standard for hospital relocation cases,
the first question is whether a purpose test or an effects test is
more appropriate. Traditional judicial deference to agency con-
structions of federal statutes and strong public policy support an
effects test.
Two HEW regulations, one promulgated in 1964106 and the
other in 1973,107 expressly prohibit recipients of federal funds
from adopting program administration and site selection policies
which have discriminatory effects. The Supreme Court articulated
103 See id. at 408-21 (concurring and dissenting opinion, Stevens, J.).
104 See id. at 303-04.
105 See 100 S. Ct. at 374 (majority opinion, Blackmun, J.); id. at 379 (dissenting opinion,
Stewart, J.).
106 The first prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from utilizing "criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination
because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or sub-
stantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals
of a particular race, color, or national origin." 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1979) (emphasis
added) (originally promulgated at 29 Fed. Reg. 16,298 (1964)).
107 The second regulation, even more pertinent to hospital relocations, states in relevant
part:
In determining the site or location of a facilities [sic], an applicant or
recipient may not make selections with the effect of excluding individuals from,
denying them the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination under any
programs to which this regulation applies, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin; or with the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially im-
pairing the accomplishment of the objectives of the Act or this regulation.
45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(3) (1979) (emphasis added) (originally promulgated at 38 Fed. Reg.
17,979 (1973)).
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the proper standard of review of agency regulations in Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission v. Aragon.'1 8  In deferring to a ter-
ritorial commission's interpretation of a statute, Justice Vinson ob-
served:
To sustain the Commission's application of this statutory term,
we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable
one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the
question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings....
All that is needed to support the Commission's interpretation is
that it has "warrant in the record and "a reasonable basis in
law".' 0
9
In other decisions, the Court has emphasized that such deference
is particularly appropriate when the regulation "involves a
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged
with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion." I1
Given the absence of clear legislative intent,"' courts should
follow Aragon and defer to HEW's regulations. As the Supreme
Court implicitly recognized in Lau,"2 an effects interpretation is
certainly reasonable in light of the antidiscriminatory policies of
Title VI; indeed, such a standard would most effectively eliminate
discrimination by recipients of federal funds. 1 3  Moreover, at the
time of the statute's adoption, the Supreme Court appeared to
apply an effects test even to allegations of constitutionally pro-
scribed discrimination," 4 and it was not until 1976 that the Court
108 329 U.S. 143 (1946).
109 Id. at 153-54.
110 Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
In Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969), the Court
stated that a regulation will be sustained so long as "it is reasonably related to the purposes
of the enabling legislation under which it was promulgated." See Trafficante v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
433-34 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
I"' See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
112 414 U.S. 563 (1974). In a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, Justice Stewart observed that "the validity of a regulation promulgated
under a general authorization provision such as § 602 of Tit. VI [sic] 'will be sustained so
long as it is reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.'" Id. at 571
(citing Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) and Thorpe v.
Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)).
13 See notes 118-24 and accompanying text infra.
114 See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (state redistricting ruled un-
constitutional deprivation of fifteenth amendment right to vote because its "inevitable ef-
fect" was to disenfranchise black voters); cf Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25
(1971) (courts should decide constitutionality of statute on basis of its "social content or
effect," not on basis of legislature's motivation); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
384 (1968) ("inevitable effect" of statute on its face may render it inconstitutional, regard-
less of legislative motive); Friedman, supra note 65, at 17-23.
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expressly rejected an effects test in favor of a purpose test."15
Thus, when HEW promulgated its regulations, there was con-
siderable support for the view that Congress intended an effects
test for Title VI. Congress' failure to specify a different standard
after the agency promulgated the regulations may indicate tacit
congressional approval of an effects test. Finally, one regulation
was promulgated in 1964 and thus represents a contemporaneous
construction of the statute.
Courts should also consider the policy ramifications of the
purpose test. Proof of intent is a formidable obstacle for civil
rights plaintiffs to overcome, and courts that require such proof
may eviscerate Title VI as a weapon for private litigants and en-
forcement agencies. As one commentator has observed:
Intent, like all states of mind, is a subjective condition that
does not lend itself to clear and persuasive proof. The inherent
difficulty in demonstrating any subjective motivation will often
prove unsurmountable.
16
The burden of proving intent weighs particularly heavily on
plaintiffs alleging discriminatory hospital relocations. The multi-
plicity of decisionmakers involved in site selection may frustrate a
plaintiff's efforts to gather evidence probative of intent.''
Further, the plaintiff's discovery may not yield documents or rec-
ords that contain bold statements indicative of discriminatory
purpose; decisionmakers will undoubtedly seek to camouflage
such intent.
By facilitating successful challenges of discriminatory site
selections, an effects standard would encourage decisionmakers to
consider possible discriminatory effects of any proposed plan, and
deter them from implementing discriminatory relocations. In ad-
dition, by preserving the statute's value for private redress, an ef-
fects test would comport with the Supreme Court's tolerant at-
titude toward the Title VI private cause of action." 8
Advocates of the purpose standard claim that Congress could
only have intended the harsh cut-off remedy for cases of inten-
tional discrimination.'1 But this argument is misleading. Con-
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
116 Friedman, supra note 65, at 24.
117 For example, in NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 453 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del.
1978), numerous agencies were involved in the hospital site selection process. Id. at 288.
118 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); note 29 and accompany-
ing text supra.
9 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363, 374 (1979) (dicta).
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gress intended fund cut-off to be a remedy of last resort"2°-the
statute and the relevant regulations require agencies to attempt to
secure voluntary compliance before imposing this sanction.
121
Moreover, the statute authorizes effecting compliance "by any
other means authorized by law." 122 This broad provision permits
courts to redress Title VI violations without cutting off funds.
123
It remains to determine which of the three effects tests is
most appropriate to hospital relocation actions. The rebuttable ef-
fects test 124 is, of course, most desirable for plaintiffs, but its de-
nial of nondiscriminatory justifications works excessive hardship
on defendants and the general populace. Even the most careful
planners may find it difficult to implement a relocation without
causing some discriminatory impact on some group. Moreover,
hospital relocations will often reflect a legitimate cost-benefit
analysis. A generally more efficient and equitable allocation of
health care resources may well justify some discriminatory impact.
The irrebuttable effects standard therefore fails to take into ac-
count defendants' administrative needs and society's interest in ef-
fective delivery of health care.
The disparate treatment standard 12.5 for Title VII actions
seems inappropriate for different reasons. Closely tailored to
employment discrimination cases, the disparate treatment stan-
dard applies best where the victim of discrimination is an indi-
vidual. 12  Hospital relocations, however, generally affect entire
neighborhoods. In addition, the disparate treatment standard re-
quires the plaintiff to show pretext after the defendant has met a
minimal burden of rebuttal of the prima facie case.'12  This stan-
120 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 7067 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff).
121 See 45 C.F.R. § 80.8 (1979).
122 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1(2) (1976).
122 See, e.g., Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1293-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See
generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133,
1247-50 (1977). See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
'21 See notes 54-62 and accompanying text supra.
125 See notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra.
126 To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the disparate treatment
standard, a plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qual-
ifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
127 See notes 70-73 and accompanying text supra.
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dard thus raises the same obstacle the purpose standard imposes:
the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant's state of mind be-
fore the defendant offers any substantial evidence of a nondis-
criminatory justification.
The Title VII disproportionate impact standard 128 is most
appropriate for hospital site selection cases; it allows the defen-
dant to present some justification without foreclosing most plain-
tiffs from judicial relief. The three stages of the Title VII analysis
easily translate into the hospital site location context. First, as in
employment disproportionate impact cases, the plaintiff should
show that the planned site and proposed policies -although neu-
tral on their face-will have a substantially disproportionate im-
pact on his class. The burden should then shift to the medical
center to show that the challenged policy relates to the function-
ing of the hospital-in the same way that employers must show
job-relatedness. 29  The hospital could sustain its burden by show-
ing, for example, that the proposed move or policy would serve a
greater number of people more efficiently and economically. If
the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff should be allowed
to prevail by showing that another less discriminatory site or pol-
icy would equally well serve the hospital's legitimate interests.
B. Appropriate Relief
Courts have not yet fully defined what constitutes appropriate
relief in the private Title VI suit. Injunctive and declaratory relief
find strong support both in lower court opinions 130 and in the
Supreme Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols.'3  The propriety of
the damage remedy, however, remains an open question.
132
128 See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
129 In Larry P. v. Riles, No. C-71-2270 RFP (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1979), the court could
not translate the job-relatedness requirement into the educational context, since IQ tests
were dissimilar to employment-related tests.
130 See, e.g., Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Bossier
Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); Lora
v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
131 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See. notes 88-91 and accompanying text supra.
132 Compare Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (dicta) (damages not allowed in Title VI suits) and Rendon v. Utah State Dep't
of Empl. Security, 454 F. Supp. 534, 536 (D. Utah 1979) (damages not allowed in Title VI
suits) with Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F. Supp. 842, 847 (D. Neb. 1975) (court has
subject-matter jurisdiction over Title VI suit for damages); Flanagan v. President & Dtrs.
of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1976) (assuming that damages
would be appropriate) and Chambers v. Omaha Public School Dist., 536 F.2d 222, 225 n.2
(8th Cir. 1976) (court expressed no view about damages relief).
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In the Wilmington setting-a suit challenging a discriminatory
hospital relocation plan-courts should not hesitate to impose an
injunction. The administrative scheme for enforcing Title VI en-
tails a federal agency investigation of a discrimination claim, fol-
lowed by efforts to secure the offender's voluntary compliance. If
the violator refuses to comply with Title VI, the agency may cut
off federal funding.133  Similarly, a suit for injunctive relief in-
volves a court "investigation" of a plaintiff's discrimination claim,
followed by a prohibition of the unlawful activity. The defendant
must either comply or remove himself from the ambit of Title VI
by giving up federal funds. In short, the private suit for an in-
junction closely parallels the administrative remedy. Both provide
the offender with a choice: stop discriminating or stop using fed-
eral funds.
A more troublesome question arises when the plaintiff seeks
damages for a prior hospital relocation that has had a dis-
criminatory impact. The damage remedy arguably provides a di-
rect monetary incentive for parties to sue, and hence aids in the
overall enforcement of Title VI. In addition, the threat of liability
may deter potential Title VI offenders and encourage present
offenders to mend their ways.
On the other hand, awarding damages against defendants
like the Wilmington Medical Center may eventually diminish the
quality and accessibility of health care. Hospitals forced to pay
damages out of limited resources may be unable to afford new
construction or improvements, and plans for better facilities may
remain on the drawing board. An award of damages to the Wil-
mington plaintiffs, for example, may condemn the entire inner-city
population to the status quo- deteriorating downtown facilities.
Alternatively, hospitals may simply pass on the costs of damage
The issue of damages for Title VI suits has been discussed frequently in suits claiming
violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (popularly referred to
as § 504). E.g., Meiner v. Missouri, No. 79-1050C(2) (E.D. Mo. filed Jan. 21, 1980) (no
cause of action for damages under § 504). Section 504 was modelled almost verbatim after
Title VI and complaints are administratively handled through the same procedures and
regulations. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-80.10, 81, 84.61 (1979).
As one court recently noted, "Though a few cases have dealt with this issue [awarding
damages] in the context of Title VI, the law is equally unclear with respect to that stat-
ute." Meiner v. Missouri, No. 79-1050(C)(2) (C.D. Mo. Jan. 25, 1980). One other case
recognized the possibility of Title VI damage suits, but did not decide the issue. See Cham-
bers v. Omaha Public School Dist., 536 F.2d 222, 225 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976).
,33 See 45 C.F.R. 55 80.7, 80.8 (1979).
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awards to their patients. In an era of skyrocketing medical ex-
penses,' 34 this is an unattractive prospect.
Moreover, courts should not allow a remedy that strives
primarily toward a goal of compensation. The Title VI adminis-
trative scheme evidences no congressional intent to compensate vic-
tims of prior discrimination. Congress sought to induce future
compliance, not remedy past wrongs. Unlike injunctive relief, the
damage remedy affects a hospital's future behavior only indirectly
through deterrence. To the extent that the facility simply passes
its costs on to society or foregoes improvements, the damage rem-
edy does not encourage compliance.
Finally, damage awards may cause facilities that depend heav-
ily on federal funds 135 to give up that aid. As one court recently
noted, "[a] recipient of federal funds might well decide to forego
such assistance when faced with the possibility of liabilities ap-
proaching or exceeding the funds received." 131 If so, the ulti-
mate victims will be the beneficiaries of federally-funded pro-
grams, not the perpetrators of discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Private Title VI suits can be an effective method of assuring
accessibility to adequate health care. The utility of such suits,
however, may depend upon what standard of proof courts ulti-
mately require for a prima facie case of discrimination and upon
what types of relief courts are willing to grant.
Traditional judicial deference to administrative regulations
and strong public policy support an effects test for- Title VI. Of
the various formulations of the effects test, the Title VII dispro-
portionate impact standard is most appropriate for hospital relo-
cation cases. It prescribes a shifting of burdens that would allow
defendants to present some justification without foreclosing most
plaintiffs from judicial relief. Moreover, the Title VII terminology
could be easily translated into the Title VI context.
134 See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
135 Whether or not an institution would be willing to forego federal funds would neces-
sarily be related to the degree of dependence on federal funding. In a case such as Wil-
mington, for example, where the institution receives 35% of its operating revenue (see 427
F. Supp. at 923 n.13) from federal sources, an institution would probably decide to comply
rather than lose funding.
116 Meiner v. Missouri, No. 79-1050(C)(2) (E.D. Mo. Jan. 25, 1980).
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Courts should hestitate to give damage awards in private Title
VI suits, however. Injunctive relief is more appropriate in light of
the congressional purpose underlying the statute, the administra-
tive regulations, and the goal of providing better health care.
Valerie A. Seiling
